1 A Question Regarding “Existence”

At the end of the previous article on Buddhism (see article:Systematic Review of Buddhist Theory (2): The Tree of Awakening—The growth context of Buddhist theory: Dependent Origination, Five Aggregates, and Causality), we traced along the thread of Buddhism's “tree of cognition” toward a deeper question: Are the observer and the observed truly independent of one another? The answer given by Buddhism is that they are not distinctly separate, but share the same root in the mind. From this, we further arrived at an even bolder conclusion: the so-called “world” is not an external object that exists independently of the mind.

How, then, does the “world” actually exist? If we take another step forward along this line of inquiry, we discover that before asking how the ”world” exists, we seem to first need to clarify an even more fundamental question—what is “existence”？

In everyday life, we rarely consider “existence” itself as a question that requires reflection, because it almost always serves as our starting point for understanding the world, rather than an object of understanding—we usually subconsciously take the premise that something already “exists” for granted, and only then proceed to discuss what it is, what attributes it has, where it comes from, and its relationships with other things.

However, once “existence” itself is brought forth for questioning, what originally seemed self-evident begins to grow complicated:When we say that a thing “exists,” what are we actually saying? Does it mean that it can be seen and touched by us, like a chair or a cell phone? Or does it mean that, while unable to be perceived directly by us, it can be known through observation and reasoning, like electromagnetic waves or particles? Or does it mean that it does not even rely on a concrete material form, but can be known by us as an abstract concept, like numbers or words? The ways these things exist are clearly not the same, yet we seem to be able to say of all of them that they “exist.”

Is there, then, some common foundation behind these different modes of existence?

Suppose there is a chair in front of us; at this point, we can describe it from many aspects: material, color, shape, size, weight, and the parts of which it is composed. These attributes certainly help us know it, but the problem lies in this:These attributes do not belong solely to this single chair; another chair may just as well possess the identical material, color, shape, size, and weight, and may even be completely identical in all other attributes we can describe and measure.

Even if we continuously add more attribute descriptions to this chair, we still cannot determine, solely based on these attributes, whether what we are describing is “this chair” itself, or merely “an object possessing these attributes.”

2 From Philosophical ”Ontology” to Buddhist ”Svabhāva”

Thus, a very natural intuition arises:Behind these attributes and component parts, does there exist some more fundamental “thing,” like a base or a core, that supports these attributes and makes it this chair?

“Ontology” in philosophy is precisely structured around such inquiries: When we have described all the attributes and components of an existing entity, behind these concrete details, does there still exist some more fundamental basis that allows it to stand as an independent entity?

Historically, this line of questioning has not been unique to Western philosophy—over two thousand years ago, ancient Indian philosophy and Buddhism had already developed similar reflections. Buddhism later used the Sanskrit term Intrinsic nature to discuss this mode of existence belonging to a thing itself, which is conventionally translated as “自性” (self-nature / intrinsic nature) in the Chinese translation tradition.

Due to the ambiguity of the literal Chinese phrasing, “自性” (self-nature) is easily misunderstood in modern everyday contexts as “one's own nature” or a characteristic that distinguishes it from other things. In reality, “self-nature” here does not mean this, but rather refers to anintrinsic nature belonging to a thing itself that enables it to stand as itself, existing independently of other conditions.。

Can the “fundamental basis” pursued by philosophical ontology and the “self-nature” spoken of in Buddhism actually be found in the thing itself? We can continue to explore along our earlier train of thought: The color, material, and shape of a chair can all undergo changes, yet as long as the changes do not exceed a certain threshold, we will still regard it as the “same chair.” This means that it is very difficult for us to treat any single concrete attribute as the ultimate basis of “this chair.”

What if we dismantle this chair further? Backrest, chair legs, seat, screws... When these parts are separated one by one, the original chair ceases to exist as a result, yet we still have not found a single part that can independently bear the identity of “the chair itself.” Even if we continue to break down these parts into smaller constituent units, the result is the same. Therefore, it is equally difficult for us to take any single component part as the ultimate basis of “this chair.”

At this point, the question becomes even more direct: If that fundamental basis belonging to itself is neither an attribute nor a specific part, thenwhat on earth is this so-called “core”? Does it truly exist?

3 From “Core” to “Dependent Origination”

At the end of Chapter 2, we were searching for that “core” belonging to the thing itself, only to find that whether we begin from attributes or component parts, it is very difficult to actually find it.

Here, we cannot help but wonder: Perhaps the problem does not lie in the fact that we have not yet found this “core,” but rather in why we assumed from the very beginning that a thing must possess such a “core” in order to exist? If we temporarily set aside this presupposition, we might take a different perspective: instead of searching for a core within the thing, we observe the conditions upon which it depends to be established.

The reason a chair can present itself before us in the manner of a “chair” is inherently inseparable from many conditions: wood must grow, be felled, and be processed; parts must be assembled according to a specific structure; and the reason it can be used as a “chair” is also inseparable from the human body's structure and functional needs.

If we follow this thread further back, we will find that the conditions upon which the chair depends to be established can extend endlessly—without sunlight, water, and soil, trees cannot grow; without human manufacturing activities, a specific object like a “chair” and its functional definition would not come into being...

These conditions are not things added later onto an already existing “chair.” On the contrary, it is precisely when multiple conditions act together in a specific way that the “chair” comes to be established in the manner we know it:It is not a closed, independent entity, but a phenomenon presented under the joint operation of multiple conditions.

This is precisely the core of the Buddhist doctrine of “dependent origination” (pratītyasamutpāda). The so-called “dependent origination” does not merely mean that something is “composed of many things,” but rather that:A phenomenon is able to be established because it depends on certain conditions.

In this way, the question of “self-nature” raised in Chapter 2 arrives at a new answer:If the establishment of a thing always depends on certain conditions, then it cannot simultaneously possess a ”core” that stands independently, entirely divorced from conditions”If a thing truly possessed some completely independent “self-nature” belonging to itself, then it ought to be able to be established apart from these conditions. In reality, however, when conditions change, the state and form of the thing change along with them. This precisely demonstrates that the establishment of a thing is not entirely determined by some intrinsic nature of its own that is independent of conditions.

Therefore, from the perspective of Buddhist “dependent origination,”all things arising from causes and conditions are “without self-nature” (devoid of intrinsic nature). The so-called “absence of self-nature” means that things do not possess an intrinsic nature that belongs entirely to themselves and can stand independently apart from other conditions. The word “absence” here does not negate the manifold and complex phenomena of things before our eyes, but rather that independently self-existent nature imagined out of thin air by us—we do not say it is “without self-nature” because “things do not exist”; rather, having observed how it exists, we find that its establishment is always inseparable from certain conditions.

4 What Does “Emptiness” Really Mean?

In the preceding three chapters, tracing the inquiry into “existence,” we completed an important intellectual shift: we discovered that in the world, one simply cannot find an independently self-existent “core” (self-nature) that does not depend on external conditions. The reason all things can present themselves before us is entirely because multiple conditions intertwine within specific space and time (dependent origination).

Buddhism further uses an extremely central philosophical concept to describe this existential state of “not possessing an independent, inherent essence”:“Emptiness” (Śūnyatā)。

In modern everyday Chinese, “emptiness” (空) readily brings to mind “completely empty,” “having nothing at all,” and even further evokes negativity and nihilism. Therefore, when people encounter “emptiness” as spoken of in Buddhism for the first time, an intuition easily arises:Since everything is empty, does that mean that nothing exists?

But returning to the philosophical context of Buddhism itself, “emptiness” is neither “zero” nor “nothingness.” What it points to is precisely the conclusion we derived earlier—Things have no independent, self-existing intrinsic nature.

To say that something is “empty” does not mean that it does not exist, but rather that it does not possess anindependent, unchanging, and fixed nature.。

If one must use modern language to facilitate understanding, then “emptiness” can be understood as a”state of existence not bound by a fixed nature.“.

Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna wrote a very important verse in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*: “Because there is the meaning of emptiness, all phenomena can be established; if there were no meaning of emptiness, nothing could be established.” What this expresses is precisely:Precisely because things have no fixed, unchanging intrinsic nature, it is possible for them to arise, change, and function in dependence on conditions. If something possessed a completely independent, eternally unchanging nature, it would instead be impossible for it to truly change or arise dependently on conditions.

Note: Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna was a renowned ancient Indian Buddhist philosopher and a key founder of the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. His thought centered on elucidating the relationship between “emptiness” and “dependent origination,” exerting a profound influence on later Buddhist philosophy.

Understanding this, we can further comprehend the famous line from one of the best-known scriptures in Chinese Buddhism, the *Heart Sūtra*: “Form is not different from emptiness, emptiness is not different from form; form is emptiness, emptiness is form.”

Here, “form” is not the “lust” of modern Chinese, but material existence in the Buddhist sense, such as our bodies and the various physical phenomena before our eyes. And “emptiness” is not another entity existing behind these phenomena, but explains that these phenomena themselveshave no independent, self-existing intrinsic nature.。

Reinterpreting this sentence through the framework established earlier:

• “Form is not different from emptiness”: The concrete material phenomena before us are not entities with independent, fixed natures; they themselves are established in dependence on various conditions.

• “Emptiness is not different from form”: So-called “emptiness” is not another thing existing detached from the real world either, but a description of the mode of existence of these concrete phenomena.

Therefore, “form” and “emptiness” are not two opposing things, but two perspectives on the same thing:From the perspective of phenomena, it arises according to conditions and changes according to conditions; from the perspective of intrinsic nature, it has no independent, self-existing nature.

And when we inquire further:If things lack such an intrinsic nature, yet can indeed arise and change depending on conditions, what exactly is the relationship between “dependent origination” and “emptiness”?

5 Dependent Origination and Emptiness: Re-understanding “Existence”

After questioning “intrinsic nature,” observing “dependent origination,” and clarifying “emptiness,” we can finally bring the preceding threads together and return to an extremely vital concept in Buddhist philosophy—“dependent origination and emptiness of nature”. It is not two separate theories, but two sides of the same issue:

• Because of dependent origination, all things must rely on certain conditions to exist, and therefore cannot possess a nature that exists independently of conditions—this isemptiness of nature。

• . Because of the emptiness of nature, things lack a fixed, unchanging core, allowing them to continually arise, transform, and dissipate as conditions change—and this is preciselydependent origination。

Therefore, “dependent origination” and “emptiness of nature” are not two detached conclusions, but two facets of one reality. Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna summarized this relationship: “There has never been a single phenomenon that does not arise from causes and conditions; therefore, there is no phenomenon that is not empty.”

Thus, returning to the question raised at the beginning of this article:“In what way does the ”world" actually exist? From the perspective of the Buddhist doctrine of “dependent origination and emptiness of nature,” all things do not exist as fixed, unchanging entities, but continually come into being, change, and dissipate within causes and conditions. They arise through conditions, hence their nature is empty; precisely because their nature is empty, they are able to change along with conditions.

When we no longer cling to searching for an independent, unchanging “core,” and instead begin observing the conditions, relationships, and changes upon which things depend to exist, our understanding of “existence” undergoes a fundamental shift:Existence is no longer a “thing” waiting for us to dig out its inner core, but an ongoing process of coming into being, changing, and dissipating within causes and conditions.

This is “dependent origination and the emptiness of nature.”